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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
EUGENE ANDREINI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 16518 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court of Carbon 
County, State of Utah, with the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., Judge, presiding as a substitute for the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell, Judge, who disqualified himself. 
The appellant was charged with aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
l03(b), and the appellant was convicted of simple assault, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-5-102, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed 
or in the alternative remanded for a new trial after he has 
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had the right to take the depositions he was denied before the 
trial from which this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the lOth day of June, 1978, at the Savoy Club, a 
bar in Price, Carbon County, Utah, there was a fight between 
the appellant and James R. Priano. (Tr. 148.) 
The respondent contends that while Priano was talking 
to another, the appellant struck Priano with a pool stick. 
(Tr. 13. ) 
The appellant contends he struck Priano in self-
defense (Tr. 146) only after Priano had struck the first blow 
by giving a backhand to the appellant's head which knocked off 
his prescriptive glasses. (Tr. 180.) 
Other than the appellant and Priano, there were only 
two eye witnesses who saw the fight begin. Both of them testi-
fied that before the appellant had done anything physical 
toward him, Priano struck the first blow in the same manner as 
contended by the appellant. (Tr. 150, 161, 162.) 
In addition to wearing prescriptive glasses, the 
appellant also suffered from a back injury he received when 
13 years old by having been run over by a truck. (Tr. 17 8.) 
After being struck by Priano, the appellant went 
down to the floor and came up with a pool stick from an area 
where broken pool sticks were customarily kept. (Tr. 151.) 
The pool stick was in the appellant's left hand. And the 
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appellant is right handed. Crr. 180.} 
There was fighting, wrestling, and scuffling between 
the appellant and Priano. (Tr. 13, 17, 37, 38, 45, 76, 77, 
78, 80, 148, 150, 158, 161, 162, 173, 180, 181, 184, 185.) 
And others separated them. (Tr. 15, 17, 64, 65, 70, 71, 76, 
78, 79, 80, 81, 151, 162, 173.2 All of it lasted only about 
30 seconds. (Tr. 17. 2 It was a very short time. It was over 
just like that, really. (Tr. 151.) 
Even after the two had been separated, Priano walked 
toward the appellant (Tr. 17, 45, 1812, gritting his teeth and 
holding his arms like he was going toward the appellant again. 
(Tr. 181.) He turned and left the scene only after being 
threatened by the appellant. (Tr. 181.) 
The above constitutes a general statement of the 
appellant's version of the facts. Other details will be cited 
in support of the points of argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS 
BEFORE TRIAL. 
The appellant filed a motion to take depositions be-
fore the lower court with the purpose of obtaining additional 
information from witnesses and using said information for its 
impeachment value on cross-examination. The lower court 
-3-
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denied appellant's motion. 
In the case of State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 
P.2d 12 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court unanimously held in an 
opinion written by then-Justice Crockett that it was error for 
the accused to be denied the right to take depositions before 
trial. At page 16 he stated: 
D. The most serious attack upon 
the judgment is that the court 
erred in rejecting defendant's re-
quest to take depositions of the 
witnesses. , We willingly concede 
that it is difficult to understand 
••hy the district attorney opposed 
the taking of depositions. He may 
ha·,-e misconceived his duty. Not-
withstanding the fact that under 
our adversary system it is essen-
tial that he represent and safeguard 
the interests of the State, it is 
neither necessarv nor desirable that 
a prosecutor conduct either a perse-
cution or an inquisition. His 
responsibility is to assist in an 
inquiry into the facts to ascertain 
the truth to the end that justice 
be done. While we do not deem it 
to be grounds for reversal here, 
for reasons explained below, we are 
not favorably impressed with the 
failure to permit the taking of 
depositions of the witnesses. 
Four justices held such error not be be prejudicial 
because the defendant in that case failed to claim that he 
would have obtained any additional information from the depo-
sitions and because he had failed to assert the depositions' 
value for purposes of cross-examination at trial. 
-4-
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The fifth justice, then-Justice Henriod, dissented, 
believing it was prejudicial error to deny the accused the 
right or privilege of taking depositions, and stated: 
The main opinion points out cor-
rectly that the accused had access 
to information obtained by the 
Grand Jury, (citations omitted) 
and was furnished answers by the 
district attorney to interroga-
tions put to him. But it loses 
sight of the fact that such infor-
mation was not the product of 
sworn testimony el~cited by ques-
tions aut bt counsel of the 
accuse 's c o~ce. It seems to 
lose sight also, of the fact that 
. . . the right to take deposi-
tions frequently [is] the sharpest 
weapon available to counsel in 
piercing subsequent testimony by 
confrontation with prior incon-
sistent testimony. Such an oppor-
tunity, denial of which appellant 
assigned as error, quite frequently 
results in impeachment that may 
make the difference between guilt 
or innocence in the minds of 
veniremen. At 359 P.2d 18. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In concurrence with Justice Crockett's proposal of 
proper prosecutorial procedure, it is submitted that the ves-
tiges of sporting event surprise trials of the past should now 
yield to the modern due process fairness model in search of 
truth and justice. 
Later, the Utah Supreme Court, in its opinion written 
by then-Justice Tuckett in the case of State v. Nielsen, 
-5-
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522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974), surprisingly ruled, without refer-
ence to its unanimous decision to the contrary in Guerts, 
supra, that it was not error for an accused charged by complaint 
to be denied the right to take depositions before trial, except 
when a material witness for the defendant is about to leave the 
state or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds 
for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the trial. 
Then-Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented in the 
Nielsen case, with the controversy centering around Rule 8l(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). 
That rule provides: 
Application in criminal proceedings. 
These rules of procedure shall also 
govern ~n any aspect of criminal 
proceedings when there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, 
that any rule so applied does not 
conflict with any statutory or con-
stitutional requirement. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Nielsen the defendant argued, and the appellant in 
the instant appeal now argues, that Rule 30 (URCP), which pro-
vides that "any party may take the testimony of any person 
by deposition upon oral examination" is applicable through 
Rule 8l(e) to criminal proceedings. 
The majority in Nielsen, no longer sitting on the Utah 
Supreme Court, found Rule 30 (URCP) to be in conflict with Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-46-1 and 2. Justice Crockett in his dissent 
-6-
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persuasively pointed out that in fact no conflict exists as 
§§ 77-46-1 and 2 do not cover the taking of depositions. 
Justice Crockett concluded: 
Additionally, the majority in Nielsen was concerned 
with the possibility that the prosecution would attempt to 
take the deposition of a defendant and thus violate his right 
against self-incrimination. Again, Justice Crockett pointed 
out that the majority's concern was not warranted: "No one 
supposes that any procedural rule could deprive a person of 
his constitutional rights; and Rule 8l(e) clearly so indicates." 
At p. 1369. (Emphasis added.) 
In sum, the appellant argues that this court should 
adopt now-Chief Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion and 
overrule the Nielsen case. 
In Granato v. Salt Lake County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 
750 (Utah 1976), the majority never reached the issue of depo-
sitions being taken by the defendant. In Justice Maughan's 
dissent at p. 755: 
-7-
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Plaintiff finally urges he should 
be permitted to take depositions, 
and that State ~. Nielsen, Utah, 
522 P.2d 1366 (1974) should be 
overruled. With this contention, 
I am in complete agreement. A 
defendant in a criminal action 
should be permitted to take depo-
sitions; 
He then writes Justice Henriod's dissent in Guerts 
quoted above in appellant's brief. 
The time is long past due to correct this inequality 
of justice in Utah between the right of a defendant in a civil 
case, the right of state in a criminal case and the denial of a 
defendant in a criminal case to take depositions for the same 
purposes. If the right to take depositions is afforded a defen· 
dant in civil cases, where he stands to lose only his dollars 
and cents, surely that same right should be afforded a defendant 
in a criminal case, where he stands to lose his life or liberty. 
This court should reverse the lower court's order 
denying the appellant's motion to take depositions and remand 
this matter to the lower court with the order that the appellant 
be granted the right to take depositions for discovery, cross-
examination, impeachment, confrontation, or any other purpose 
afforded a party in a civil case. 
Such a ruling would be consistent with the mandates 
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United 
States Constitution and Utah Constitution, and of the 
-8-
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confrontation of witnesses guarantee of Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. 
This case on appeal particularly points out the 
discriminatory denial of equal protection to the defense to 
take depositions while allowing the prosecution that power, 
which it exercised September 11, 1978, before preliminary hear-
ing and trial. (Tr. 148, 156, 163, 168, 171.) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-20, the State has 
powers to depose witnesses in the investigation of crime, even 
secretly, if necessary. To deny the defense that right of 
investigation technique for preparation of his defense is a 
denial of equal protection. There is no policy reason to jus-
tify perpetration of this inequality. The accused is presumed 
innocent until convicted, and he should be afforded the same 
rights as the government in preparation of his case. 
Even the new rules of criminal evidence provide for 
both parties to take depositions. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY 
PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." The Utah Constitution has a similar provision 
-9-
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found in Article I, Section 12. 
The United States Supreme Court has held the Sixth 
Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses 
against him is a fundamental right binding upon the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Pointer 
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965}. 
"The right of confrontation embraces the right of 
cross-examination." Chester J. Antieau, Modern Constitutional 
Law, Sec. 5:74, Vol. One, 1969, The Lawyers Cooperative Publish-
ing Company. 
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, calls cross-
examination "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth." V Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 (3rd ed.}. 
It is submitted that for the above reasons careful, 
strict scrutiny should be given to the restrictive rulings dur-
ing appellant's cross-examination of the victim. The rulings 
prohibited examination designed to bring out the truth of the 
event. This limitation upon the fact-finding process is patent 
error. Broad scope should be afforded to the cross-examiner 
to elicit the full facts of the occurrence. This was denied 
and an injustice resulted. 
This court is invited to read the transcript with 
strict scrutiny at pages 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 43, 
44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 71, 96, 127, 132, 133, 139, 140, 142, 
143, 144, 145, 198, 199.) 
-10-
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As examples, the appellant was not permitted to 
have Priano give his lay opinion relative to common matters 
such as comparing types of scratches he received then and at 
other times. (Tr. 33, 34.2 
The appellant was not permitted to show possibilities 
relative to self-defense other than as testified to by Priano. 
(Tr. 39.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show through 
Priano that other witnesses disagreed with him relative to who 
struck the first blow. (Tr. 40.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show through 
Priano that at no time did the appellant poke Priano in the 
forehead with the pool stick. (Tr. 43.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show through 
Priano that the event could have happened other than as Priano 
testified on direct examination. (Tr. 44.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show through 
Priano what was said and done between Priano and the appellant's 
wife at a prior time at the Hollow Bottle relative to the 
appellant's state of mind. (Tr. 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 67, 68, 
71, 144, 145.2 It was not hearsay because it was not offered 
for the truth of matter asserted. It was offered only to show 
the appellant's state of mind. (Tr. 145.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show through 
Priano that his injuries could have been caused by means other 
-11-
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than the pool stick, such as wrestling, scuffling, and bumping 
into other objects. The appellant state there was evidence of 
wrestling and scuffling. The court ruled there had not been 
such evidence (Tr. 127), when in fact there had been such evi-
dence. (Tr. 15, 17, 37, 38, 44, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 76, 77, 
78, 79, 80, 81, 150, 151, 158, 161, 162, 173, 180, 181, 184, 
185.) 
The appellant was not permitted to show bias by close 
relationship between witnesses relative to credibility. (Tr. 
198, 199.) 
Although perhaps any one of these erroneous rulings 
would not have amounted to prejudicial error, cumulatively they 
reached that level and denied the appellant effective cross-
examination to insure his right to confrontation. 
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965), it was held that the Sixth Amendment's 
right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him was 
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and was made 
obligatory on the states by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; and that the confrontation clause of the 
Sixth Amendment was thus enforceable against the states under 
the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards which 
protect the right to confrontation against federal encroachment 
To the same effect are: Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); Brookhart v. 
-12-
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Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16~. Ed. 2d 3l4 (1966}; 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S. Ct. 468, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
420 (1966); Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 
527 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 
88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 
U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 reh. denied 392 U.S. 
947, 88 S. Ct. 2270, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1412 (1968); Berger v. 
California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S. Ct. 540, 21 L. Ed. 2d 508; 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684; 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 
274 (1969); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 
1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969). 
A primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to 
secure the right of cross-examination. Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); 
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 
956 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968). 
The Supreme Court has established that under certain 
circumstances the restriction of the scope of a defense attor-
ney's cross-examination of a particular prosecution witness 
may constitute a violation of an accused's constitutional 
-13-
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right of confrontation. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 
S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968). 
In this case, the restricted cross-examination was 
of the State's principal witness. A thorough searching, sift-
ing of his recollection of the event, his credibility, his 
motive, prejudices, and his inclinations were thwarted by the 
cumulative effect of the trial court sustaining the State's 
objections. The cross-examination, as a reading of the tran-
script shows, was not by design argumentative but rather to 
impeach the witness. The right to impeach a witness by cross-
examination is universally recognized. Am. Jur. Witnesses 
§ 676. 
CONCLUSION 
The time is ripe for reversing the sporting event 
surprise tactics of the Nielsen case, supra. 
A criminal trial should be a search for the truth. 
Defense depositions taken before trial can aid that endeavor 
by preserving recitations of fact as in civil trials. Allowing 
defense depositions enhances the defendant's right to confron-
tation, preservation of testimony, and the impeachment of wit-
nesses. 
The inequities of this case wherein the government 
takes depositions without the presence of the defense and the 
defense is denied that opportunity patently discriminates 
-14-
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without any worthy policy consideration. 
And such restrictive cross-examination because of 
the many erroneous evidentiary rulings amounts to a denial of 
an adequate defense. 
This court should reverse or remand with an order 
allowing depositions and a new trial with guidelines for proper 
evidentiary rulings. 
DATED this \ ~ day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
//-;~ \ \ 
. ~ ;lj;Lj[_, \-- , . \ ~usee. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served on the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
\~Jtt: day of March, 1980. 
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